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The Auditing Profession: Facing Up to Change
The author discusses the changing role of the
auditor. This article is adapted from a speech
given by the author at the Joint Annual
Meeting of AWSCPA and ASWA in Houston,
Texas in October 1975.
Dr. J. Herman Brasseaux, CPA, is Professor
and Chairman of the Department of
Accounting at the University of New Orleans.
He holds a Ph.D. degree from Louisiana State
University in Baton Rouge and a CPA
Certificate from the State of Louisiana.
Dr. Brasseaux is co-author of The
Auditor's Report and Readings in
Auditing and has published several articles on
accounting. He is currently a member of the
Auditing Standards Executive Committee of
the AICPA; however, the views he expresses in
this article are his and do not necessarily reflect
those of the AICPA Committee.

Dr. J. Herman Brasseaux, CPA
New Orleans, Louisiana

Change and the Profession
Change is a way of life and all institutions
and professions, like individuals, have
some difficulty coping with this phenom
enon. The auditing profession finds itself
in the midst of change and the challenges
which have accompanied this period have
been numerous and difficult.
We should not overlook the fact that the
auditing profession shares the currents of
change with the broad spectrum of service
providers in our society. All groups, espe
cially professional groups, which provide
service are facing demands for change.
The tendencies in the market which are
characterized as "consumerism" have af
fected those who sell a service as well as
those who sell a product.
Society's level of expectation for ser
vices has and is continuing to rise. Con
sumers (users) demand not only more
services but also better quality services
and are more discriminating in regard to
services rendered. Additionally, there is a
tendency for consumers to seek legal re
dress for services which are below ex
pected standards.
To get a better perspective it might be
advantageous to view the auditing profes
sion as a subset of a larger service group
which might be referred to as the "disclo
sure industry" or "information pro
viders." This larger group has felt a public
outcry for more information. This call for
more disclosure is partly, but in this
writer's opinion only partly, an aftermath
of Watergate. Various groups in the dis

closure industry are reexamining their
roles. This is especially true of the Securi
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC)
which is reassessing its role in policing
new demands for more disclosure from
business to investors and the public. Au
ditors with their unique role in the disclo
sure process cannot hope to escape the
dialogue and the consequences of change.
The current period of change will un
doubtedly alter the boundaries of the pro
fession. In fact it already has. The dimen
sions of the traditional role of auditing are
changing and new types of services and
new responsibilities are emerging. When
we look back upon this period, i.e., the
mid 60's to mid 70's, we will likely con
clude that this was the most significant
period for the auditing profession since
the 30's and the era of McKesson Robbins.
Many leaders within the profession
have observed that the expectation level
for auditing services and the responsibility
level of the auditor have risen at an unrea
sonable and alarming rate within the last
few years. This kind of "future shock"
pace, many feel, is on the verge of getting
out of hand if it has not already done so.

Response to Change
There is a tendency among groups provid
ing services to resist rapid fundamental
change. This bias is generally well
founded as society's basic "wants" change
in a gradual fashion.
The auditing profession's bias against
change — at least rapid basic change — is

well anchored. This tendency is perhaps
not an unlikely one for a profession whose
service is still not widely understood or
recognized by the general public. Some
critics might suggest that historically the
"personality type" attracted to auditing
reinforces this tendency to avoid change.
It is abundantly clear, however, that the
spirit of the times which has thrust the
disclosure industry onto center stage
compels a response on the part of the
auditing profession. The profession is re
sponding to demands for change — albeit
sometimes reluctantly. It is widely recog
nized that the major catalysts contributing
to the profession's response for change are
the courts, regulatory agencies (especially
the SEC), and the investing community.
This has prompted the observation by
some that the profession's role has been
one of reacting rather than initiating ac
tion.
The primary professional body for defi
ning the role of the independent auditor is
the Auditing Standards Executive Com
mittee of the American Institute of CPAs.
This committee interprets auditing
standards, sets guidelines for practice and
reacts to calls for a broader scope of service
and responsibility. The Committee
functions largely as a synthesizer of
policies and procedures in use in many
major and some of the smaller auditing
firms.
The Committee consists of twenty-one
part time members, most of whom are
auditing practitioners. During 1974-75,
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there was one member from a federal
agency and one from academia. The Au
diting Standards Division of the American
Institute of CPAs provides the permanent
staffing and research support for the
Committee.1 The Committee's official
pronouncements are entitled Statements on
Auditing Standards. These SAS's (twelve to
date of this writing) are issued only after
they have gone through an exposure
period for comment from interested par
ties and have received at least a two-thirds
affirmative vote by the Committee.2

Some Current Issues
Receiving Attention
The number of SAS's being published be
lies the numerous issues under considera
tion in the profession and the volume of
work carried on by the Committee and the
Auditing Standards Division.

Recent SAS's
The Committee's output and pace of activ
ity have steadily increased in recent years.
During 1975 and through January of 1976,
the Committee issued the following
SAS's:
SAS No. 5

The Meaning of "Present Fairly in Con
formity with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles" in the Independent Auditor's Re
port (July, 1975)
SAS No. 6

Related Party Transactions (July, 1975)
SAS No. 7

Communications Between Predecessor and
Successor Auditors (October, 1975)
SAS No. 8

Other Information in Documents Containing
Audited Financial Statements (December,
1975)
SAS No. 9

The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on
the Scope of the Independent Auditor's Ex
amination (December, 1975)
SAS No. 10

Limited Review of Interim Financial Informa
tion (December, 1975)
SAS No. 11

Using the Work of a Specialist (December,
1975)
SAS No. 12

Inquiry of a Client's Lawyer Concerning Liti
gation, Claims, and Assessments (January,
1976)
SAS No. 5 on "present fairly" was an
attempt to deal with the extensive recent
controversy regarding the real meaning of
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the auditor's report. The profession has
been most concerned that the view ad
vanced by some, including the courts, that
"present fairly" means more than con
formity with generally accepted account
ing principles would force the CPA into an
intolerable position and would impair the
utility of the auditor's opinion. The SAS
(1) defines "present fairly" within the con
text of generally accepted accounting
principles, (2) establishes the need to con
sider substance rather than form in the
application of accounting principles and
(3) directs the auditor to consider whether
the accounting principles used are appro
priate in the circumstances. At the same
time the SAS does not go very far in
clarifying the auditor's responsibility for
the financial statements and provides little
guidance in the selection from among al
ternative accounting principles.
One of the most troublesome problem
areas for auditors is that which is iden
tified as "related party transactions." Fi
nancial statements may faithfully reflect
transactions; however, if the transactions
were "arranged" between parties on a less
than arm's length basis, then the financial
statements are false and misleading. The
tasks of defining, discovering and disclos
ing related party transactions present the
auditor with perhaps insurmountable dif
ficulties. Extensive and heated debate en
sued before a consensus was reached to
publish some guidelines in the form of an
SAS. The SAS puts all auditors on notice
to be aware and suggests additional audit
ing procedures to help uncover manipu
lated transactions. The auditor's duty is to
discover and understand the true nature
of such transactions and insist that
adequate disclosure be made in the finan
cial statements. The auditor's ingenuity,
integrity, and hard-nosed objectivity will
be truly tested in applying this new SAS.

The SAS on "other information" breaks
some new ground and deals with the au
ditor's concern with representations made
by management in the annual report,
other than the financial statements, which
may be materially inconsistent with the
audited financial statements or which may
be material misstatements of fact. The au
ditors deafly do not audit any part of the
annual report other than the financial
statements. However, they now are ex
pected to read the other information and
take steps to remove significant inconsis
tencies or misstatements of fact which
come to their attention. Thereby they are
taking some added responsibility for the
protection of investors and others.
One of the most controversial issues
facing the profession concerns the need

for and the nature of the auditor's in
volvement with interim financial informa
tion. Although the issue has been under
consideration by the profession for several
years, no one would deny that the SEC's
action in this matter brought the issue to a
head and precipitated action by the pro
fession.

For some time, the SEC has called for
auditor involvement with interim finan
cial information on a less-than-audit basis.
The majority of the profession has
strongly opposed direct auditor associa
tion with interim financial data on a lessthan-full audit basis. The profession has
argued that the auditor's public associa
tion on a limited review type basis would
provide an appearance of added credibil
ity without adding substantive credibility.
Also, there has been much concern about
the increased liability risk which public
association with interim financial informa
tion would introduce.
In 1975, the SEC issued Accounting Se
ries Release No. 177 which requires the
inclusion of interim income data as a
"footnote" to the annual audited financial
statements of most publicly traded firms.
After strong objections were voiced, the
Commission agreed to have the footnote
marked unaudited. The auditor, however,
is considered to be associated with such
footnote information and is expected to
make a limited review of the interim data,
at least on a retrospective basis. In addi
tion to requiring the footnote, the SEC
Release permits (1) the registrant, in con
nection with filing its interim reports, to
report that its auditors have made a timely
review of its interim data, and (2) the
auditors to file a letter stating that such a
review has been made.

The Auditing Committee in December
of 1975 issued SAS No. 10 on limited re
views. This SAS is the first of two SAS's
expected to be issued on this matter. SAS
No. 10 describes the new service, outlines
the procedures which constitute a limited
review and provides guidance and limits
on the reporting. In this SAS the new
service is directed to assisting the board of
directors and mandates that the auditor's
report on the limited review be restricted
to the board and management of the
client.
At the time of issuance of SAS No. 10
the Committee postponed the issue of
public reporting, i.e., reporting to the
SEC, stockholders and others. Since the
SEC action in ASR No. 177 mandates pub
lic association of the auditor with the un
audited footnote data in the annual au
dited statements and permits association
with interim (quarterly) data filed with the

SEC, the Committee is forced to face the
question of public reporting and an expo
sure draft on this matter has been issued.
The exposure draft on public reporting
does permit the auditor to render a report
based upon a limited review and permits
this report to go to outside parties. The
recommended format of the report uses
very guarded language, but never
thelesss, it does represent providing some
form of limited assurance on a review
which is less than an audit.
The SAS on the audit inquiry letter to a
client's lawyer (SAS No. 12) is significant
in several respects. This issue created a
major controversy — in fact, almost a con
frontation — between the auditing and
legal professions. A compromise was fi
nally reached, but the SAS has brought to
the surface a critical and sensitive issue,
i.e., the duty to provide full disclosure in
financial statements versus a firm's right
to self-protection from the revelation of
secrets and confidential dealings. The au
ditor is most concerned with full disclo
sure; the attorney with confidentiality.
Unasserted claims became a pivotal ques
tion and the agreement in the SAS calls for
the client's management rather than the
attorney to provide that information to the
auditor. The information provided to the
auditor should be based on the client's and
the attorney's interpretation of the re
quirements of generally accepted account
ing principles, viz., Financial Accounting
Standards Board Statement No. 5.

Other Current Issues
Great public concern has arisen regarding
the responsibility for disclosing noncompliance with laws and regulations by
business firms. Greater public sensitivity
in the wake of Watergate and the disclo
sure of widespread illegal political con
tributions, bribes in foreign countries and
others have been factors in creating pres
sure for action. The SEC and other regu
latory bodies are reassessing their role and
auditors, too, must reexamine basic as
sumptions and face up to their responsibil
ity, if any, on this sticky issue. For the
profession the question is: should the au
ditor in conducting an examination to de
termine the conformity of financial state
ments to generally accepted accounting
principles be responsible to look for infrac
tions of laws and regulations? Or, should
the auditor report such infractions (only) if
they come to his/her attention in the per
formance of an audit? Further, should the
relationship, i.e., the proximity, of the
effects of the infractions to the financial
statements be the controlling factor? The

issues are complex and far-reaching; how
ever, it is likely that auditors will be ex
pected to take some responsibility to deal
with infractions which they uncover in the
course of their audits.

The auditor's responsibility to detect er
rors and irregularities (frequently referred
to as fraud) is also of widespread current
concern although the issue has been
around as long as auditing itself. In the
aftermath of the wave of litigation against
auditors from the mid 60's to the present
and sensational scandals such as Equity
Funding, loud demands for changes in
auditors' responsibility for fraud have
emanated from many quarters including
the financial press. There are many mis
conceptions surrounding this issue in
cluding what auditors presently do con
cerning fraud, what the professional liter
ature directs auditors to do, and what they
should do and be held responsible for. The
profession has been criticized for the self
serving negative thrust of professional
guidelines on responsibility for fraud in
SAS No. 1. The debate in and out of the
profession will undoubtedly result in a
re-definition of the auditor's responsibil
ity for fraud in more positive terms. The
profession's final position on this question
is not likely to satisfy all critics, however.
Many outsiders feel that the subsequent
discovery of undetected fraud is conclu
sive evidence of negligence by the auditor,
whereas auditors maintain that some
frauds may be so cleverly concealed, for
example, through forgery or collusion,
that assurance of detection through a
normal audit is not feasible. The profes
sion will likely declare that the discovery
of fraud in financial statements is an objec
tive of the audit examination while, at the
same time, clearly holding that the audit is
not a guarantee of the discovery of all
frauds.

the form of new areas of service, must be
our professional goal.
One significant attempt to be respon
sive to the current era of change has been
the appointment recently of an Auditing
Commission by the AICPA. This highlevel Commission is examining the nature
of auditing and the expectations of users
of the audit function, considering the
types (or degrees) of assurances which
auditors do and should provide, and con
sidering how professional standards
might best be established. The Commis
sion has a broad and optimistic agenda
and will undoubtedly be a positive force in
the profession's response to change.
The changes we now face and will face
in the future affect all professional accoun
tants, whether they be in public account
ing or industry. The solutions will be more
effective if all of us contribute our efforts to
the task.

Notes
1For more information see: Hyman Muller,
Journal of Accountancy, "The Auditing
Standards Division: Responsibilities, Authority
and Structure," September 1975, pp. 50-54.
2SAS No. 1, issued in 1973, is a codification of
previous pronouncements, which were entitled
Statements on Auditing Procedures.
3The procedures in SAS No. 10 constitute the
appropriate procedures for reviewing the "un
audited" footnote as required by SEC regu
lations.

A Look at the Future
Many significant issues, in addition to
those cited above, are currently being
pondered by the profession and the future
looks no less challenging. The increasing
complexity of business operations along
with society's continuing demand for
greater accountability suggest that the au
ditor will be asked to assume a wider role
and broader responsibilities. The profes
sion should be prepared to consider a
wider scope of service — after, of course,
an appropriate weighing of all of the
cost-benefit implications for society as
well as the profession. Progress, in the
form of a more effective audit role and in
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